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BACKGROUND 
The transition to constitutional democracy in South Africa occasioned 
profound institutional and normative changes to the criminal justice 
system. It raised awkward and prickly challenges to reorient the system 
so as to make it compatible with the new constitutional values, and enable 
it to apprehend and prosecute criminals within the confines and ethos of 
the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2 of the Constitution) The nub of the challenge 
for the criminal justice system was - and remains a formidable one, and 
is well illustrated in the important Constitutional Court judgment of Judge 
Johan Kriegler: 
the transition to the new dispensation kept the general body of South 
African and rhe of state intact. the advent of rhe Bill of Rights 
exposed all whether statuwry or derived from the 
common law, to in the lighr of the new constitutional norms her-
alded by that transition The retention of the existing legal and administrative 
structures facilitated a smooth transition from the older order to the 
new. But rhe transItion did have an effect on the country's Criminal 
tem. who had acquired speCialised knowledge of the system, and 
become skilled and sure-footed In irs practice, were confronted with a new en-
vironment and lost their confidence. Particularly in the lower courts. where the 
bulk of the criminal cases is decided. Judicial officers. 
practitioners and investigating officers were uncertain about the of super-
Imposing the norms of a rights cuhure on a system rhat had evolved under a 
wholly diFferent and about the effect of that in a gIven 
case. Bail was no exception. On the contrary, much debate, and 
much of the concern in official circles about law enforcement has been directed 
at the or refusal of bail." 
I Calland. a practising member of the London Bar. is head of PIMS. the Political 
Information & Monitoring Service at Idasa: Advocate Masuku is senior constitutional ana-
lyst in PIMS. and a former clerk to Constitutional Court Judge Richarcl Goldstone. Masuku's 
conrribution to the is based upon his profound belief in the South African Constitu-
tion. set against the backdrop of what preceded it. Callancl's derives substantially 
from a different experience. acquired from - if South Africa is now a constitutional 
nirvana constitutional backwater of the United Kingdom. In this sense, our collabora-
tion reflects another feature of the debate: it is a global one. in which tile same challenge is 
to be confronted in the South and the North. in the first and in the third world. 











































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Later in the judgment he says: 
"An important aim of this judgement is [0 show that the application of constitu-
tional norms to the law and of bail does not complicate the task of JU~ 
dlcial officers but clarifies it 
In simple but cogent fashion, Judge Kriegler thus explained the constitu-
tional position of the law of bail in our legal regime. What necessitated 
this examination was the uncertainty that suddenly faced the lower courts 
in many cases. culminating in [he cases of S v Diamini; S v Joubert and S v 
Scheitekat regarding the proper interpretation of the right to bail for the 
accused person in custody. Nowhere in the post-apartheid criminal juris-
prudence has there been so much uncertainty as in the adjudication in a 
criminal trial of the rights of an accused to a fair trail on the one hand and 
the right of the publIC to be protected from criminals on the other. The 
requirements for fair criminal process were arguably already in existence, 
in theory, in pre-constitutional era common law. However, the criminal 
justice system was not completely ready to adjudicate criminal cases 
within the principles entrenched in the Bill of Rights when the Constitu-
tion came into effect. The transition of the criminal justice system from 
one which disregarded the basic tenets of a fair criminal process to one 
which had to operate within the strict requirements of the Constitution 
tested every principle of policing, arrest, prosecution and incarceration 
against the right to a fair trial, dignity of the person, privacy of the person 
and need for procedural fairness. The Constitution remains the static, 
unwavering document on which the criminal process must be based and 
which protects the rights of criminals. But what makes this a 
welcome and timely publication, is that it raises an awkward and prickly 
challenge for us all (and by "we" we mean to say, progressive, pro-human 
rights, lawyers): to balance our approach to crime with our approach (0 
human rights. There are, we contend, two ways of responding to the 
challenge: to take the comfortable option the well trodden road in which 
we re-state past heterodoxies of procedural fairness and other 'non-
negotiarables' of the pro-human rights progressive movement or the 
uncomfortable option in which we each and every particle of our 
respective standpoints to the most stringent tests. 
2 THE SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION' 
The supremacy of the Constitwion makes every aspect of law and con-
duct subject to it. Courts are obliged to declare as unconstitutional and 
therefore unlawful any law or conduct inconsistent with the Constitution." 
') S v Dlamini: S v Joubert, S v Schietekat 1999 (4) SA 623 (CC). 
4 S 2 of the Constitution of the RepubliC of South Africa, 1996. srates rllat 'This Constitu-
[jon is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid. 
and the imposed by it must be fulfilled. 
5 The relevant seC[lons read: 
122 
Powers of courts in constitutional matters 
172 (I) When deciding a constitutional rnatter within its power. a coun -
must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsisrent with rhe Constitution is invalid 
to the extent of its inconsistency; and may rnake any order that is JUSl and equilable. 
including 









































TOUGH ON CRIME AND STRONG ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR US ALL 
Such laws and conduct must be struck down or 'modified' to ensure con-
sistency with the Constitution The Bill of Rights entrenches the protec" 
tions that every accused must enjoy, However, rights in the Bill of Rights 
are not absolute, they are subject to justifiable limitations.' This limitation 
provision will determine the content of the rights and their scope in given 
situations. This paper analyses the effect of the limitation provision on 
crime and human rights. It seeks to resolve the conflict between protect-
ing the rights of the accused on one hand, and protecting the rights of the 
victim the public interest - on the other. 
3 THE IMPACT OF CRIME ON THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS 
Constitutional adjudication involves weighing up conflicting rights, and 
giving decisions based on an appreciation of the values contained in the 
Constitution. Faced with a matter involving crime and human rights, 
judges have had no problem stating the obvious that crime must be 
deterred and that it is the duty of the court to ensure that, where evidence 
is suffiCient, a convicted person is given an appropriate sentence. How 
well the criminal justice system is coping is a fair starting point for a 
debate based on a very simple proposition: that crime is a social evil that 
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity: 
(il) an order the declaration 01 invalIdity for and on any 
conditions. to allow competem authority to correc! the 
(2) ta) The Supreme Court of Appeal. a High Court or a (oun of similar status may 
make an order the constitutional validity 01 an Act of Parliament, 
a provincial All or any of the President. but an order of constitutional 
invalidity has no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court 
(b) A coun wtuch makes an order of constitutional invalidity may a tempo" 
interdlC! or other temporary relief TO a party. or may the pro· 
pending a decision of the ConstilUtional Court on the validity of that 
An or conduct. 
National leglsJarion must provide lor tile referral of an order 01 constitutional 
invalidity [() the Constitutional COllrt. 
(d) Any or organ of state with a sufficient interest may appeal. or 
Inherent power 
to the Constitutional Court to confirm or vary an order of 
by a court in terms of this subsection. 
t 73 The ConstitLHional Coun. Supreme Court of Appeal and High COUrtS have the 
inherent power to protect and regula[(' their own process, and to develop the 
common law. taking into account the irltprests of justice. 
(, S 35 provides for the rights of the accused, arrpsted and convicted person. 
7 S 36 reads 
(I) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
applicarion to the extent that the limitation IS reasonable and justifiable in an 
and democratic society based on human dignity. equality and freedom. 
into account all relevant factors, including -
(a) the naturp rile right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation: 
(C) the nature and extent of the limitation: 
(dl the relallon between the limitation and its purpose: and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subs (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
often leads to powerlessness and frustration; that it has the potential to 
undermine the often burdened resources of state; that it undermines 
individual and collective security; that criminal activities always violate the 
rights of citizens; that citizens must be protected against crime; and that 
criminals must be brought to justice. A crime-infested environment en-
courages a rapid collapse of ethics and morality, a rise in corruption and 
inefficiency, and often leads to deep social insecurity. Crime there-
fore carries the potential to undermine the imperatives of good and 
effective governance, to undermine the power of the state to protect 
human rights, and beyond this, the potential to threaten the democratic 
state itself. The courts are the prime custodians of the Constitution, and are 
enjoined by the Constitution to defend the rights of people whenever these 
are threatened. 
4 THE ESSENCE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The essence of an organised criminal justice system in modern govern-
ance is to deter crime, or achieve a substantive reduction of crime, the 
apprehension of criminals and their eventual incarceration. It has a 
central role in protecting citizens from abuse and insecurity, Its role has 
become indispensable in modern governance in constitutional democra-
cies for two reasons: there is evidence that entrenched forms of crime and 
corruption have a disempowering effect on the of government to 
fulfil its constitutional duties, and there is a recognition that stable 
government is a precondition for economic growth. Given, furthermore, 
the extent to which the current South African government's macro-
economic policy relies upon foreign direct investment to drive its 
overall growth strategy, the increase in crime or indeed the perceptions 
of the incidence of serious crime among potential investors overseas -
threatens the prospects for such investment. The criminal justice system 
therefore derives its legal and moral authority from the requirements 
of stable governance, security of citizens ·and the need for economic 
growth. 
In South Africa, the criminal justice system the constitutional 
duty of upholding the protection of citizens within the framework of a 
constitutional rights-based way of operating. This was a break from a 
system whose operation in the past was frequently characterised by 
violations of human rights. If the criminal justice system fails to meet its 
obligations, its credibility is at stake and the rights of citizens will be 
eroded. releasing the potential for authoritarian rule or chaos. This would 
be a breach of its constitutional duty. The criminal system is built 
on the institutional and normative vision encapsulated in the Constitution 
from which it derives its authority to take away certain rights of convicted 
criminals, But the question of how to successfully manage crime in South 
Africa within the confines of the Constitution throw the system into 
confusion, especially the lower courts, as observed by Kriegler in 
the Dlamini case. How can justifiable limitations be placed on the protec-










































TOUGH ON CRIME AND STRONG ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR US ALL 
the Constitutional Court decisions dealing with the right to fair trial indi-
cate the delicate balancing act required to achieve permissible and lawful 
convictions .• 
5 THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
One of the major goals, and indeed the constitutional mandate, of gov-
ernment, is the creation of sustainable security structures for its citizenry. 
It does this by assembling a criminal justice system that has the capacity 
to discharge the requirements of criminal prosecution and punishment. It 
is a constitutional duty in terms of which the state must respect. protect. 
promote and fulfil the rights of its citizens contained in the Bill of 
The constitutional terrain on which crime must be combated is the 
subject of controversy and vigorous public debate. In short, the Constitu-
tion has become a popular scapegoat for poor policing, poor rates of 
conviction and a perception of rising. uncontrollable crime. Willie Hof-
meyr, the head of the Asset Forfeiture Unit of the National Directorate of 
Public has argued in support of the drastic powers given to 
his unit to confiscate proceeds or instruments of crime by saying that 
unless crime, especially organised crime, is controlled, the hard-won 
rights and freedoms enshrined by the Constitution will be worthless in the 
face of lawlessness. At a human rights seminar in October 2000. Hofmeyr 
spoke of hiS fear that anti-human rights forces would, for the purposes of 
their own political agenda, seek to disturb the integrity of democratic 
transition and to discredit the constitutional im peratives for crime control. 
Having first spoken intriguingly of how he thought that the democratic 
settlement in South Africa is in many ways vulnerable to "populist attack 
either from the left or the right", Hofmeyer went on to comment as 
follows: 
"I think it is thaI some of the only really semi-successful - I would 
call them populist [0 the transitional process has been nOt on too 
few houses or too bad education or anything else. But It has been in the area of 
crime with organisations like Pagad,iV here In the Western Cape. which essen-
tially used what is perceived to be an inability to deal with crime effectively [Q 
advance their own political but one that includes a sort of radical anti-
rights agenda as part of the programme." 
8 S v Zuma &. others 1995 (2) SA 642 CC: Right ro fair rrial - conslillllJOnali[y of the 
presumption relating to the admissibility of confessions in s 217( 1 )(b)(ii) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 5 v ,t1akwanyam' and another 1995 (3) SA 391 CC considered and de-
clared unconstitutional [he provisions allowing for the death penalty 
Osman and ano[her v [he Transvaal 1998 (4) SA 1224 (eC): 1998 
(1 1) BCLR 1362 (CC) dealt with the right to fair trial the constitutionali[y of s 36 of the 
General Law Amendment Act 62 of 1955 (offence of belflg found Ifl possession of goods 
reasonably suspected to have been stolen while being unable to give a satisfactory 
account of such possession) The Constitulional Court found these provisions [(] be 
constitutional 
9 S 7(2) of the Constitution. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
So far, so good; we believe that most people would share these concerns. 
But Hofmeyr went further: 
"If you go to communities in South Africa these days and talk about human 
rights you are not very in many. many places would rather 
have less fights than more crime. And I think that for me one of the gravest 
dangers to our transitIon to democracy is in not getting the balance right be-
tween how strong your Bill of Rights IS and how effectively it protects individual 
fights on the one hand and the ability of government on the other hand to deal 
effectively with cflme." 
His conclusion is that if government is unable to "deal effectively with 
crime", then the hard-won constitutional rights will be swept away in a 
tide of anti-rights hysteria. This virtually amounts to saying that human 
rights may have [0 be ignored in order to save them. The point is laudable 
for its realistic attempt at the apparent contradiction of state responsibility 
[0, on one hand, protect rights, and on the other hand, justifiable 
limitations on them. However the thrust of this comment is that it is a 
constitutional responSibility of relevant organs of government to combat 
crime, and the state may not fail to do so. If, theoretically, the state is 
unable to meet this obligation, it would have failed [0 protect the Constitu-
tion, a duty which must never be abrogated. Hofmeyr's voice is nor 
unique in its content. Policy-makers throughout the world are currently 
expressing this sort of helplessness. This is a central paradox of govern-
ment at the outset of the new century. 
Another example of the complexity of dealing with crime in a rights-
based environment are the numerous constitutional questions asked 
about asset forfeiture permitted in terms of the Organised Crime Act. A 
recent article by AJ van der Walt (2000) provides fascinating insights in[O 
the struggle against organised crime. He analyses the potency of the 
conflict between individual rights [0 property and the state's constitutional 
obligation to act in the interest of public safety. He states quite rightly that 
civil forfeiture indicates a locus of potential tension between the protec-
tion of private property in the Constitution and public interest limitations 
on the right. State powers are invoked [0 interfere with private property, 
in circumstances that are almost secretive. Forfeiture involves a state 
action by which private property is lost to the state without the consent or 
co-operation of the owner because it is used for criminal activities or is 
itself a proceed of crime. Property is seized temporarily [0 secure evi-
dence in a criminal trial or to establish jurisdiction or security: and con-
traband is often forfeited (and usually destroyed) because its possession is 
illegal. The purpose of civil forfeiture of private property is not to secure 
temporary control over property or destroy dangerous contraband, but to 
vest state ownership in the property for public benefit. In the US, some 
crime fighting organs have been funded partly from civil forfeitures. The 
scope in South Africa for forfeiture orders to include property regarded as 
instrumentalities or proceeds of crime affects both public safety and crime 
prevention. Where forfeiture is concerned, the conflict between state 
action and individual rights is heightened. The question must be answered 
by the courts when it is reasonable and justifiable to allow the public 
interest in crime Fighting to override the protection of property rights, 










































TOUGH ON CRIME AND STRONG ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR US ALL 
takes into account the due process requirement of the Constitution. There 
was controversy in South Africa about the constitutionality of provisions 
of the Organised Crime Act and many were found constitutionally want-
ing by the judiciary. However the asset forfeiture approach to crime 
control must be handled with care and sensitivity because it is a process 
that denies an accused's rights before he or she is found criminally liable. 
Due process and fair procedure must be scrupulous in order to justify such 
state action against individuals. 
Despite Huntington's third wave of democratisation and Fukuyama's 
complacent statement of the "end of history" victory for liberal democ-
racy. democracy is now imperilled ironically not by the excessive power 
of the state but by the lack of power of the state. What is needed now is 
for the state to be stronger in the face of the immensely powerful eco-
nomic forces of modern global capital and the concurrent anti-social 
Forces of globalisation (such as the dual phenomena of corruption and 
transnational criminal organisations). 
States are no longer ali-powerFul. On the contrary. with the exception of 
the remaining superpower, the US, they manifest varying degrees of 
weakness. We have not yet fully absorbed this fact, and it is this power-
lessness that has compromised the protection of human rights. This is 
particularly the case in relation to transnational criminal organisations 
(TCOs) (Williams 1997), particularly in societies in transition (Williams 
1997; Buriarek 1998). Buriarek contends that in the case of transitional 
societies, crime may rise as a result of social instability and concurrent 
criminal opportunism, and public attitudes may change so that there are 
increased calls for repressive means of dealing with criminals. Interest-
ingly, his opinion polling informs him that those Czechs who do not 
express trust in the police are more often in favour of the restoration of 
the death penalty (Buriarek 1998:220). According to this author, when 
people conclude that the state cannot deliver deterrence or suppression of 
criminal activity, they are more likely to believe in the death penalty or 
radical punitive eye-for-an-eye approaches associated with kangaroo 
courts and self-help instant justice methods. 
In South Africa, a growing frustration with apartheid's criminal justice 
system led to communities taking law into their own hands through 
kangaroo courts. In this new constitutional dispensation, community 
frustration at the perceived inability of the state to keep down crime has 
been manifested in the growth of vigilante groups. The growth in vigilante 
activities is a return to self-help methods, expressing a different point of 
view on crime prevention, at worst a vote of no confidence for the per-
formance of the criminal justice system. 
The politics of the recent era have contributed to this trend; the politics 
of individual, as opposed to collective, responsibility; and the Thatcherite 
language of moral responsibility, have served this trend. As one crimi-
nologist describes it: "The pervasive image of the perpetrator of crime is 
not one of the juridical subject of the rule of law, not that of the social and 
psychological subject of criminology, but of the individual who has failed 
to accept his or her responsibility as a subject of moral community" (Rose 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
the 1 980s and 1 990s, policy than a restorative one. I F you are deemed to 
have broken means that people are more likely to think in terms of a 
punitive criminal the 'moral code', then you forfeit your claim to human 
rights 
This danger of societal disaggregation and the weakening of community 
is compounded by a concurrent global trend in which public goods -
health care, welfare payments and pensions, and security - are commodi-
fied. There is a large body of literature that records not only the increasing 
inequality gap between the rich and the poor, but also the dissipation of 
the welfare state. Before, the state (at least in the social democratic coun-
tries of the North) would provide at least minimum levels of protection for 
Free. Now those public goods are products to be purchased - for example, 
decent housing, decent schooling, decent health care and health insur-
ance, and decent policing - inevitably excluding the poor. Private security, 
as we all know, is a massive industry in South AFrica. Those who can 
afFord to 'top-up' their security, and the security provided by the state, do 
so through private policing of some sort or another.' In any case, as 
statistics have shown, public policing levels vary greatly between poor and 
middle class areas. 
Hence, it is the poor, the most vulnerable group of society, who suFFer 
most from crime and its consequences, This leads one to the conceptual 
starting point of this paper: that the debate on crime and human rights is 
about power. This makes a diFference, we submit, to the traditional bipo-
lar approach to this subject between the "crime control" (tough on crime) 
school and the "due process" (strong on human rights) school of thoughr.'· 
Crime control demands a high rate of conviction, and places a high degree 
of trust in the police, the integrity of police-obtained evidence. Due proc-
ess, in contrast, starts From the proposition that it is better to let ten guilty 
people go free than to convict a single innocent one (Rose 1996:48) It is 
this tension that the Constitution sought to resolve by entrenching the Bill 
of Rights, making any derogation From protecting these rights subject to 
justiFiable limitations. 
Two significant points arise From this. First, the liberating eFFect of the 
Constitution; second, its constraining and restraining eFFecr." The liberat-
ing efFect provides an opportunity For the criminal justice system to for-
mulate sustainable means of crime prevention. This is important in order 
to build the structures that would enhance the legitimacy of the criminal 
1 1 According to the findings of an Institute for Security Studies report. the private security 
industry in South Africa has an annual turnover of' around RIO billion and has increased 
about five· fold since 1990 (see Irish 1999) 
12 This is a crude summary of the theoretical framework devised by the American Herbert 
Packer (1968) as discussed usefully by Rose in the context of the contemporary UK de· 
bate (Rose 1996:47). 
13 The limitation provision provides a threshold requirement in tile interpretation and 
enforcement of the Bill of Rights On of the most important questions that a court will 
ask is whether a violation of a right is constitutionally permissible under the limitation 
provision. Where it is permiSSible. there is a justifiable violation and. ironically. no viola-










































TOUGH ON CRIME AND STRONG ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR US ALL 
justice in dealing with crime. This means that the prosecution of alleged 
criminals has to be done in terms of constitutionally permissible means. 
The principles set out in the Constitution enables those in criminal justice 
to secure not only legal convictions but morally justifiable ones. There is 
certainty about what is permissible police conduct in criminal investiga-
tions. For example, while in the past police-obtained confessions were 
sufficient to convict an accused, it is not possible now without corrobo-
rating evidence. Prosecutors and the police can no longer rely on unlaw-
fully obtained evidence in order to secure convictions. There is certainty 
about what the police can and cannot do. This certainty has a liberating 
effect. It enables the law enforcement agenCies to examine with greater 
diligence what is necessary to secure convictions and manage crime. The 
criminal justice system is thus offered new challenges for dealing with 
crime, but simultaneously constrained to act within the parameters of 
constitutionally-entrenched values. 
The constraining effect of the Constitution is simply the other side of 
the same coin of its liberating effect. It is the limitation necessary to 
preserve and protect the rights of the accused without risking the individ-
ual or collective security of other individuals. This is the limitation often 
articulated in the adjudication of conflicting rights. The question for the 
police is how to secure evidence in a manner that will not contaminate 
and compromise possible convictions, and that calls for diligence in due 
process. Lessons from Canada are revealing for South Africa. While the 
Canadian Charter has its supporters who contend that, at least in the 
sphere of criminal justice, the Charter has provided important due process 
protection for innocent and for the vulnerable (Stuart 1998), it also has its 
detractors," who argue instead that, in its fundamentally undemocratic 
way, it has served to protect the interests of the rich and powerful. The 
latter viewpoint argues, for example, as follows: 
[Yjou do not need a Charter of Rights to give concrete rights to accused 
persons. The Charter is much more and much less than that. It is a whole way 
of approving or disapproving of punishment in which the unrestrained power 
of the Judiciary is central. Since the rights are merely incidental to legitimation, 
they are symbolic. discretionary, and conditional. This is what distingUishes 
constitutional rights from democratic rights, the rule of lawyers from the rule of 
law. They are meant to protect the system and not the public, and in the pro-
tection of the system the judges will ride roughshod over victims. offenders and 
anyone else who gets in their way Constitutional due process does nothing 
about the mindless. ever-expanding repression except perhaps to make us feel 
better about it. (Mandel 1996) 
Just as Mandel distrusts the legal system and its constituent players, 
Stuart's defence of the Canadian Charter derives from his fundamental 
distrust of what he calls the "expediency" of the political class. Thus, he 
believes the Charter prOVides the best protection against opportunist 
politicians with a short-term view who "dare not be softer than the courts" 
(Stuart 1998:332). The South African Constitution, following some of the 
Canadian Charter'S principles on human rights, raises the same issues the 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
vulnerability of criminal prosecution within the principles of human rights 
protection. Different views have been expressed in public by different 
groups and public officials regarding the extent to which criminal prosecu-
tion has been enhanced or hampered by the presence of the Bill of Rights. 
Those who have argued that the Constitution has handicapped eFFective 
crime prevention have often called for the reintroduction of the death 
penalty in the hope that a secure society would be the result. Those who 
argue that the Bill of Rights has enhanced the potential for the criminal 
justice system to play its role effectively often support the retention of the 
current legal framework for crime prevention. 
Whatever point of view one adopts, the central point is to recognise 
that unconstitutional means of controlling crime often lead to authoritar-
ian rule and a collapse of the rule of law. There is evidence that a collapse 
in the rule of law is the beginning of dictatorship, an abusive police force 
and a flagrant violation of people's rights. A choice between entrenched 
legal principles limiting the capacity of state to interfere with individual 
rights and heavy-handed approaches to crime that place more emphasis 
on crime combating is a choice between freedom and oppression. The 
Constitution permits that a limitation of rights is possible within means 
that must be justifiable in an open and democratic society. The Constitu-
tion permits furthermore that, in extreme cases, rights can be suspended 
for purposes of restoring public order and protecting the integrity of 
state lS The suspension of rights for such purposes is deemed constitu-
tional as it passes the test of 'legitimate government purpose' and is 
'justifiable in an open and democratic society'. The Constitution does not 
prevent the criminal justice system from being efficient and thorough. In 
fact, it demands this. The criminal justice system must prosecute those 
who violate the laws and rights of others. but within a framework of 
values agreed to by this society and entrenched in the Constitution. The 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights enhance opportunities for good poliC-
ing, successful prosecution and conviction. History shows policing outside 
the constraints of a bill of rights leads to anarchy. 
Laws and legal systems must not only be efficient, but also legitimate. 
The legal system is not merely a technical body, it is a political one too. It 
provides some form of legitimacy for government to act. It can easily be 
exploited and manipulated by those in and with power. Systems that are 
used to take away or limit the rights of people must themselves be infalli-
ble or clearly function within constraints of law. The power of the police 
and the criminal justice system to pursue their constitutional responsibili-
ties has been strengthened by the requirements for a fair trial. Criminal 
investigations contaminated by sloppiness and shoddiness will place 
insurmountable burdens on the courts to play a useFul role in crime 
combating, a result that will erode the confidence of the public. Police 
conduct outside constitutional boundaries has a limited capacity to protect 
the citizenry. 











































TOUGH ON CRIME AND STRONG ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR US ALL 
Again, however, we must be prepared to ask ourselves tough questions: 
Is this a neat, but essentially idealistic view of the relationship between 
the Constitution and law enforcement, viewed through the rose-tinted 
spectacles of someone who desperately wants to believe that it is true? 
But what if it is not: what if some of the due process procedures derived 
from the Constitution do stand in the way of effective policing? Or can we 
simply side step that by saying that "effective policing is by definition 
human-rights based policing"7 Policy makers and judicial officers must 
find the balance. But where does the balance lie? The balance can be 
found in three factors. Firstly in the institutional transformation of crimi-
nal justice system. Secondly in the creation of a national consensus on law 
and citizenry, through education, and by re-building and uniting a divided 
society, including the reorientation of key players in governance. And thirdly, 
by asking hard questions of the due process approach to criminal justice. 
6 CHALLENGES FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
6.1 Institutional transformation 
This must be directed at enhancing the legitimacy of the authority to deal 
with crime. The current government is legitimate, but it runs a network of 
institutions that have had to earn some legitimacy. Transforming criminal 
justice institutions requires redesigning them so that they meet the re-
quirements imposed by the Constitution. Besides being approachable, 
visible and accessible to the public, these institutions must be sensitive to 
the new legal ethos and capable of re-aligning their jurisprudential back-
ground in accordance with the Constitution. There must be co-ordination 
between the various institutions forming the criminal justice system. The 
prosecution and the police must work in circumstances that allow for 
greater effectiveness and accuracy in order to manage their crime preven· 
tion mandate. The various agents of the criminal justice system must co-
ordinate efforts to avoid duplication, sloppiness, and lack of accountabil-
ity. The material and literacy conditions of the police, prosecutors and all 
other relevant agencies must be improved through conferences with 
magistrates, judges and members of the civil society, and community 
structures. Courts generally are viewed as places of punishment and 
intrigue. Having inherited the character of the apartheid government, in 
which they were viewed with suspicion, courts must have a public rela-
tions strategy that encourages community co-operation but does not 
undermine their independence. Institutional transformation requires the 
strengthening and realignment of state resources and facilitating effective 
utilisation of these resources. The system should be more accountable, 
more responsive, and more transparent in the way it functions. Resource 
and budget allocation for the criminal justice system must motivate the 
officers working at every level. The administrative functions of the system 
must be equipped to deal with both simple and the complicated crimes. 
Lack of resources, or a misuse of these, or an inability to use the available 
resources wisely will often lead to frustration and disorientation, a conse-










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Thus, we can offer a tentative South African perspective on the Cana-
dian Charter debate: that the Constitution can not in itself be a panacea 
for our human rights ambitions. It is. to a significant extent, dependent on 
the capacity of the many other institutions of governance to give living 
effect to its provisions. That is a mighty challenge. 
Turning to the second matter. The creation of a national consensus on 
law, morality and citizenry must accompany the concrete development of 
community and police partnership on issues relating to punishment and 
law. This partnership would no doubt demystify crime prevention and 
court processes. Lack of transparency regarding the operation of the 
criminal justice system leads to distrust. Through education and training, 
citizens are more able to Fully participate in asserting their and 
making it difficult for criminals. The rights contained in the Bill Rights 
must be made meaningful for the citizens of the country. Once the value 
of the Bill of Rights is appreciated. it must trigger a call for citizens to 
support the legal structures set up to procect them, and to do so within the 
parameters set out In the Constitution. 
Finally. due process. In our commitment to due process. let us noc be 
prime custodians of human rights, let us not be squeamish at the prospect 
of having every aspect of due process being tested. That we do so against 
the backdrop of the Constitution is our safeguard. and with the quality of 
independent and impartial judges at the Constitutional Court. we can be 
confident that it is a meaningful safeguard Let us encourage the Hofmeyr 
approach - a creative approach to law-maf,ing that does not try and 
second guess the Constitution. but pushes the constitutional limits of what 
will help the law enforcement agencies to be effective. The courts need to 
coherently test every aspect of disputed principle against the Consti-
tution. The Constitutional Court has developed a three-stage inquiry into 
constitutionality of law or conduct. This approach answers the follOWing 
question: is there evidence suggesting a violation of the Constitution? If 
the answer is yes, then unconstitutionality has been established, then the 
second and crucial stage determines whether such a violation can be 
justified in terms of the limitation provision. If it can, then no order strik-
ing down the infringement can be made. 
As we suggested at the outset. inequality of power should be the tool of 
analysis. Hence, due process that the arrested person both at the 
point of arrest and throughout the pre-trial period is most important. That 
is the period of greatest danger, especially with police officers who rely 
heavily on confessions as the basis of their approach to criminal proof. 
That is when individuals are at their most vulnerable, as Britain learnt 
when an appalling array of unlawfully obtained confessions during the 
1 970s and 1 980s were exposed: the Guildford Four. the Birmingham Six, 
Winston Silcott and others. The problem is exacerbated when politicians 
tell the public that they are tough on crime (as UK Prime Minister Tony 
Blair and South African Minister of Safety and Security Steve Tshwete 
have done) and then have to be seen to deliver results. While ordering a 
news blackout on crime figures (as Tshwete has done) may seem to make 
the problem less severe, there is no way around addressing the need to 










































TOUGH ON CRIME AND STRONG ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR US ALL 
if you are failing to tackle the causes of crime. There is a body of literature 
which confirms that unemployment in particular is a major driving force 
behind lawlessness: "crime becomes a positive function of an index of 
'relative deprivation', typically defined as relative lack of access to a normal 
or mainstream pattern of social participation by Marshall (1950) and Town-
send (1979)" (Braithwaite 1979). As a result, politicians are forced to yield 
to pressure from law enforcement agencies to loosen the rules to make it 
easier for them to secure convictions, thus satisfying the expectations of 
the public. This is the danger now in South Africa, just as it was a danger 
in the UK in the 1970s in respect of the Irish Republican Army. A string of 
miscarriages of justice were the result of due process being defeated by a 
conspiracy of dishonesty from most quarters of the criminal justice sys-
tem. It also led to what some writers, such as Observer journalist David 
Rose, call "noble cause corruption" - the notion that, although you are 
breaking the rules, you are doing so in support of the public interest. 
The constitutional structure of South Africa provides guidelines for what 
constitutes due process. These requirements are key to the successful 
prosecution of crime and cannot be abrogated, namely the right to be 
informed of one's rights on arrest, the right to legal representation, the 
right to silence, the right not to be tortured, the right not to incriminate 
oneself, the right to bail in appropriate circumstances. These are all an 
integral part of criminal justice in a constitutional democracy. Derogating 
from these rights is unconstitutional unless such derogation can pass the 
constitutional test of justifiability in an open and democratic society. The 
rules of evidence allowing accused persons access to police dockets must 
be fair in that, while it allows the accused to prepare adequately for his or 
her defence, this must be balanced with what is in the interests of justice. 
We are calling for a systematic audit of due process rules and proce-
dures in terms of the Constitution. This review will have a triple purpose. 
First of all, to check that each and every due process rule and procedure 
conforms to the Constitution. Second, to weigh up its role in the criminal 
justice process and to ask the question 'is it necessary and important to a 
fair and just criminal system, or does the burden it creates for the criminal 
justice agencies outweigh its value?' Thirdly, the audit can thereby play an 
educating role. With each due process rule or procedure, the constitu-
tional conservatives and 'doubting Thomases' within the police and the 
criminal justice system will be given the opportunity to explain how and 
why the rule or procedure makes their job unduly difficult. 
At each point, counterbalances could also be sought. For example, in-
terviews are not tape-recorded in South Africa. Since the miscarriages of 
justice in the UK referred to above, interviews must be tape-recorded. 
PACE - the Police and Criminal Evidence Act - was the embodiment of 
the due process protective array that liberals had been calling for, and 
which the police initially hated. They have become used to it. Confessions 
are relied on far less frequently to secure a conviction. There is better 
justice as a result. Slowly the police are regaining the public trust. They 
are doing so despite their own reluctance to transform - again the point 
about institutional transformation arises - as witnessed by the recent 
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7 CONCLUSION 
These then are what we submit are the truly tough questions we must 
answer. In conclusion, it is possible to be tough on crime and strong on 
human rights: it is not a zero-sum game. It is what is demanded by the 
Constitution and indeed possible within the cons[itmional jurisprudence 
developed so far. But ro be both, to borrow Tony Blair's famous phrase, we 
must be tough on crime and rough on the causes of it. In other words, it is 
through the largely unchartered prism of socio-economic rights that we will 
discover how to balance the two imperatives. If we can navigate a macro-
economic approach that channels the potential of [he new global economic 
order towards realising social and economic rights, then we will begin the 
gargantuan task of being tough on crime without diluting human rights. 
Along the way of this inevitably Sisyphusian challenge, we must exam-
ine the detail of our criminal justice systems, From the institutional con-
struct and culture, to the procedures that govern both pre-trial and trial 
crime control. To do so thoroughly, bo[h right and leFt must let go of some 
of their most deep-seated orthodoxies. The right must learn that 'good' 
constitutions do not create 'bad' societies (we are here using their own 
bleak, black and white pseudo-moralistic language); that only weak, lazy 
and cowardly governments blame their own constitutions for their Failings 
as has been the case in South Africa recentlyY' and that humane criminal 
justice procedures designed to protect the weak and vulnerable do not 
threaten eFFective, well-resourced and well-trained law enForcement agenCies. 
We must not only accept, but invite and encourage innovative policy-
making that will serve the constitutional right of human security, and will 
s[reng[hen the capacity of the state to maintain the rule of law at a time 
when it is weaker than it has ever been beFore, not least in its contest with 
organised, and oFten transnational criminals, whose contempt for human 
dignity and for the poor and vulnerable must attract our own contempt. 
However - and this is our Final word - when it is suggested that the 
human rights Frontier should be rolled back in the name of being tougher 
on crime, we must apply the most rigorous of tests. I ndeed while we have 
called for an audit of due process rules in this paper, we think that it is not 
only apposite but also right that the onus of proof should lie with those 
policy-makers who wish to weaken the due process rules and that their 
standard of prooF should be the highest: that any dilution of due process is 
necessary beyond all reasonable doubt. 
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